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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: POWER OF SECRETARY OF
LABOR TO SUBPOENA DOCUMENTS UNDER
LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT
THE PowER of the Secretary of Labor to investigate for past or pros-
pective violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act' was recently dealt a harsh blow by a federal district court. In
Mitchell v. Teamsters, Local Union 299,2 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan held that Section 6oi of the act did not
require the Union to comply with certain subpoenas duces tecum issued
at the request of the Secretary of Labor. The court also indicated that
if the statute did require compliance with the subpoenas it would be
violative of the-fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.
The controversy arose when two locals of the Teamsters Union
sought temporary restraining orders to prevent the enforcement of the
subpoenas.8 All parties agreed that the Secretary had no probable cause
on which to base his request for the documents in question. The Sec-
retary, however, contended that the statute authorized such a request
and that the statute was constitutional. The Union argued that the
Congressional power to regulate union affairs under the commerce
clause extended only to activities substantially related to the collective
bargaining function and also that the subpoenas were improper because
the requested information concerned records kept prior to the passage
of the act.4 The court's conclusion that the subpoenas were unauthor-
ized by statute or that the statute was unconstitutional, however, seems
to be based on arguments the parties felt were relatively unimportant.5
Regardless of the reasons presented by the court, its holding appears
erroneous.
The court's holding that the subpoenas were unenforceable was
'29 U.S.C.A. § 401 (Supp. 196o).
2 191 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
'The suit for a restraining order was dismissed by stipulation because service could
not be had on the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary then petitioned the court for an
order directing the unions to show cause why the subpoenas should not be enforced.
This proceeding resulted in the decision in the instant case.
"Brief for Respondent, p.5, Mitchell v. Teamsters, Local Union 299, 192 F. Supp.
229 (E. D. Mich. 196i).
Out of a total of 38 pages of brief the unions devoted 7 pages to those points the
court apparently felt were decisive. The government addressed 2o of its z6 pages to
these points.
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based on a construction of Section 6oi of the act which, in effect, re-
quires that the Secretary have probable cause for an investigation of
union records. The legislative history of the Act does not support such
a construction: 6
As originally worded, this section would have given the Secretary the authority
to investigate the books and records of persons reporting under the act only
when he had probable cause to believe that a person had violated the provi-
sions of the act.... But the words "probable cause" would throw a monkey
wrench into the Secretary's investigative machinery. . . . the Secretary could
be dragged into court until the question of probable cause had been decided.
Under nearly every statute requiring the filing of reports, the Administrator
can conduct "spot check" investigations unhampered by the "probable cause"
requirement. Our amendment rewrites this section to give the Secretary
investigatory power when he believes it necessary in order to determine
whether a violation has occurred or is about to occur.
Clearly the act was designed to prevent the very requirement that was
imposed in the instant case.
The judicial construction given to similar provisions of other acts is
also opposed to this decision. Speaking of subpoenas under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Supreme Court in Oklahoma Press Piiblishing
Co. v. Walling stated that "the very purpose of the subpoenas and of
the order, as of the authorized investigation, is to discover and procure
evidence, not to prove a pending charge or complaint."7  The Court
likened the investigatory function of the Administrator under this
statute to that of a grand jury, noting that the inquiry should not be
"limited... by... forecasts of the probable result of the investigation.""
Similar determinations have also been reached under the National Labor
Relations Act.'
In its search for the constitutional limits imposed by the search and
seizure provisions of the fourth amendment the court looked to two
famous cases, FTC v. American Tobacco Co.,10 and Oklahoma Press
a S. Rm. No. 187, 86th Cong. ist Sess. 91 (1959).
7377 U.S. 186, 2ox (1945).
a d. at z6.
'NLRB v. Northern Trust Co., z48 F.2d 24, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 731 (1945)
Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 1i7 F.zd 692 (941).
10 264. U.S. 298 (19z4). In this case complaints had been filed with the Federal
Trade Commission charging respondents with regulating the resale prices of their com-
modities and the Commission, pursuant to a Senate resolution, was engaged in an investi-
gation of these complaints. The FTC ordered the American Tobacco Co. and P.
Lorrillard & Co. to produce a variety of letters, telegrams and reports to salesmen and
certain named corporations. The court denied enforcement of the subpoenas. Despite
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Piblishing Co. v. Walling." In the American Tobacco Co. decision
Mr. Justice Holmes had strongly admonished courts against permitting
fishing expeditions into private papers on the chance that some evidence
of crime might be disclosed. The court in the instant case categorized
its problem as one of determining whether the American Tobacco Co.
case had been delimited by the more recent Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. decision. Indicating that any relaxation of the American Tobacco
doctrine applied only to corporations,' 2 the court concluded that even if
some relaxation applicable to unions had occurred the subpoenas in the
instant case failed to meet this test. Upon closer analysis, however, this
conclusion appears to be in error.
In support of its position, the court looked to that part of the Okla-
Mr. Justice Holmes admonition against fishing expeditions, however, the narrow holding
was that the Commission had failed to show that all documents requested were relevant
to the inquiry.
"1 327 U.S. 186 (1945). This opinion consolidated the questions presented by two
Courts of Appeals cases. The first was Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
147 F.2d 658 (roth Cir. 1945), the second, Walling v. News Printing Co., Inc., 148
F.zd 57 (3d Cir. 1945). In both instances the administrator had requested certain
documents by subpoenas duces tecum, pursuant to sections 9 and x i (a) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. After hearings under show cause orders, the district court allowed
enforcement of the subpoenas. Enforcement was denied in the second case. The
Oklahoma Press decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court while the News Printing Co.
decision was reversed. The reasoning of the Circuit Courts differed, however, and
certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. The decisions in both cases were affirmed.
2 In reaching this conclusion the court reasoned that Oklahoma Press had concerned
only corporations and consequently that any relaxation of the fourth amendment as
applied to unions was inadvisable. In support of this proposition the court cited
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (x958), holding the N.A.A.C.P. a proper party
to assert- the rights of individual members to refuse to disclose membership in the
organization. After determining that the subponeas requested in the instant case were
sufficiently broad to require disclosure of union membership lists, the court concluded
it would "not by judicial legislation encourage the extension of the 'fishing expedition'
into the field of personal rights." Mitchell v. Teamsters, Local Union 299, 191 F.
Supp. 229, 233 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
The conclusion that Oklahoma Press is inapplicable to unincorporated associations is
highly questionable in light of United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), which
held that for fifth amendment purposes a union may be treated as a corporate entity.
In making this determination the Supreme Court stated: "[The] ... test is whether one
can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular type of organization has a
character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be
said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents,
but rather to embody their common group interests only. . . . labor unions-national
or local, incorporated or unincorporated-clearly meet this test." United States v. White,
supra at 701. It would seem that this reasoning deserves more consideration than is
apparent in its summary dismissal by the court because "Fifth Amendment problems are
not present here." Mitchell v. Teamsters, Local Union 299, supra at 232.
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homa Press opinion which states that the "relevancy and adequacy or
excess in breadth of the subpoena are matters variable in relation to the
nature, purposes and scope of the inquiry," concluding: 3
Therefore, if the judiciary is to play any role.., it must make an independent
determination of the basis or impelling motive of the investigation. The
query then presents itself: how can it be determined whether or not the sub-
poena can be tested for relevancy, adequacy or excess in breadth?
The Secretary, by admission, had no substantial reason for requesting
the documents covered by the subpoenas.14 Accordingly, the court
reasoned that if the statute permitted such a request, it had eliminated
the means to test the subpoenas and was, for this reason, unconstitutional.
The two cases relied on by the court do not, however, adequately
indicate the present state of the law. To be sure, the American Tobacco
decision did refuse to allow liberal use of the administrative subpoena.
However, Brown v. United States'15 decided four years later, relaxed
many of these restrictions. This case distinguished Hale v. Henkel, 6
the early case that had been the basis for Holmes' admonition in Ameti-
can Tobacco, and held that a subpoena directed against an unincorporated
association of manufacturers was not too broad even though it requested
all letters and telegrams passing between the association and its predeces-
sor in interest. Oklahoma Press is usually cited as reflecting the weaken-
ing trend against fishing expeditions.17 This case does suggest that the
role of the judiciary is to prevent abuse of the investigative process.
However, it also indicates that this process does not offend the fourth
amendment if the disclosure sought is reasonable:"8
The requirement of "probable cause supported by an oath of affirmation"
literally applicable in the case of a warrant, is satisfied in that of an order
for production by the court's determination that the investigation is authorized
by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can order, and the documents sought
are relevant to the inquiry.
Since the court seems to concede that the investigation is for a purr
pose which Congress may authorize, 9 the remaining problem is to
"s Mitchell v. Teamsters, Local Union 299, 191 F. Supp. 229, 232 (E.D. Mich.
1961).
", Id. at 229-230.
1 8276 U.S. 134. (1928).
12201 U.S. 4 3 (i906).
'Davis, The Administrative Power of Imestigation, 56 YALE LJ. iliI, 1131
(1947).
" Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. x86, 209 (194.5).
'0 The court passed over the argument of the unions that Congress has power to
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determine which documents are relevant to the inquiry. The test of
relevancy today seems to be based on a determination of whether the
documents requested may disclose a violation of the act, not whether
they are relevant to the stated purpose of the inquiry. Indeed, one
presently applied test seems to be "is it impossible that the records
requested will show a violation?"2
The Supreme Court in United States v. Morton Salt Co." passed
on the question of relevancy as required by the fourth amendment,
noting that the requirement can be met "even if one were to regard the
request for information . . . as caused by nothing more than official
curiosity . ... ""2 Thus it appears that the Constitution does not, as
supposed by the court in the instant case, require that the administrator
have some element of probable cause before subpoenas duces tecum may
be issued. Further, since the Secretary requested only records required
to be kept by law, it is quite possible that these documents would disclose
a violation.
Because neither the language of the statute nor the requirement of
the fourth amendment supports the conclusion of the district court in
the instant case, it is probable that this decision will be reversed by an
appellate court. If such a reversal is not forthcoming, the decision will
greatly hamper investigations under the Landrum-Griffin Act.
regulate only those union activities substantially related to collective bargaining, appar-
ently assuming that such power exists. See Johnson v. Local Union No. 58, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 181 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. x96o),
upholding the constitutionality of this statute.
"
0 Whiteside Ford, Inc. v. United States, 206 F.2d 627, 634 (9 th Cir. 1953).
21 338 U.S. 632 (195o).
2
'1d. at 65z.
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